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This paper assesses the effects of private capital and independent regulatory agencies on 
telecommunications performance by using cross-country panel data from 1990 to 2003. 
In general, we find that having independent regulatory agencies positively affects 
affordability and labor productivity, but negatively affects quality; while having private 
capital positively affects access, quality and labor productivity, but negatively affects 
affordability. However, reform policies affect developing and developed countries 
differently in some cases. We also find that governance plays an important role as it 
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The economic literature on telecommunications reform is one of the largest on 
infrastructure reform (certainly larger than sanitation and any transport service and 
arguably in close competition with energy).  This results partially from the relatively 
good quality of economic data on telecoms.
1 But the academic popularity of the sector 
also stems from three of its characteristics. First, telecoms’ impressive rate of 
technological change seems to have broken more bureaucratic impediments to change 
than reformers could have ever hoped for. Thus, it is important to get a sense of how 
much pro-active reforms added to the gains offered by the technological trend.  Second, 
in spite of the high potential for competition in the sector, its complex regulatory 
dimensions seem to drive the size and distribution of the rent generated by the 
technological revolution. Third, the relative importance of the increased role of private 
operators in service delivery continues to be a source of argument.  
The drivers of the impact of reforms and their distribution have been quite well 
documented in a plethora of country specific studies (with a very significant share on the 
US and the UK).
2 The impact of reforms has also been tested in cross-country studies but 
these are significantly scarcer than country specific ones. We review some relevant cross-
country studies later in some detail.  Their country coverage varies from as little as 12 
countries as in Fink et al. (2001), with a focus on Asian countries, to 200 countries as in 
Wallsten (2003), with both developed and developing countries. We do a cross-country 
analysis on the impact of reforms on telecom performance by using a database of 204 
countries, 153 developing and 51 developed. The sample size is thus the largest so far—
although only marginally so when compared to Wallsten’s.  
When drawing general lessons for reformers, the main advantages of a large 
sample are that it reduces the risk of sample selection bias and allows a quick diagnosis 
of the differences in the impact of reforms across country types—e.g. developed vs. 
developing. Its main disadvantage is that it limits the policy assessment to fairly broad 
categorizations of reforms in order to ensure cross-country compatibility. In this paper, 
we focus on the following two broad categorizations of reforms: (i) the commitment to 
open the sector to private operators as a proxy for the commitment to open the sector to 
competition; (ii) the commitment to ensure a fair and efficient regulation of the residual 
monopoly elements in the sector.  We test for the impact of these two reform policies on 
access, prices, quality and labor productivity in both developed and developing countries. 
This paper adds to earlier work by increasing significantly the coverage of time 
elapsed since the start of the reforms. While our sample starts only in 1990, it ends in 
2003; which is 4 to 6 years more than most of the previous studies. 
3 This is significant 
since major reforms actually took place during the latter part of the 1990s in many 
countries and hence most of the earlier studies only covered a couple of years since the 
                                                 
1 This quality and availability owes a lot to the efforts of the International Telecommunications Union. 
2 For a recent survey, see for instance, Ai and Sappington (2004). 
3 In past studies, the period coverage started at the earliest in 1980 (Gutiérrez, 2003) and ended in 2001 at 
the latest (Li and Xu, 2004).   2
reform.
4  Another contribution of the paper is the modeling of the effects of corruption in 
the sector and their interactions with reform policies. These interactions add useful policy 
results to Wallsten’s inclusion of a governance variable as a driver of performance.
5  
Finally, we also look into the relevance of investment risk and its interactions with 
reform policies for telecom performance. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers background on the state of 
reforms in the sector. Section 3 discusses the performance indicators available and 
presents basic statistics. Section 4 summarizes previous cross-country academic literature 
on the impact of telecom reforms. Section 5 presents the econometric analysis resulting 
from this larger database on telecom performance. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. THE MAIN “MACRO” REFORMS IN TELECOM 
 
The reforms of the 1990s brought major changes to the traditional structure of the 
telecommunications sector. Until then, the typical operator was a monopolistic state-
owned company. In most countries, this monopoly was self-regulated or regulated by the 
government rather than by an independent agency. The main drivers of regulation tended 
to be fiscal or employment concerns instead of service oriented concerns. Indeed, prices 
were often intended to generate fiscal revenue rather than to reflect costs and complex 
cross-subsidy schemes. 
This situation changed with the major technological shocks of the 1990s. Besides 
the unbundling of the sector stimulated by the technological revolution, the first common 
element of reforms across countries may be the opening to competition. In most 
countries, this materialized by an increased role of the private capital in the sector.   
Indeed, state-owned operators were usually separated in multiple companies and in most 
cases they were sold, given in concession or licensed to private operators or investors 
which in turn started to compete with the incumbents and other entrants. Because there is 
no reliable measure of the degree of competition for a large sample of countries, the 
existence of private capital investment in telecoms may be the best proxy to document the 
commitment of the government to increase competition in the sector. It relies on the 
minimum volume of information and yet it gives a reasonable sense of the commitment 
to competition for the largest possible sample of countries.  It is clearly not perfect since 
the opening to the private sector is necessary but not sufficient to increase competition. 
However, the experience suggests that the existence of private capital and the existence 
of competition are highly correlated when both are measured correctly.
6  
According to the data from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) on 
whether a country has at least some private ownership in their telephone companies, the 
                                                 
4 As shown later in a summary table, on average, developing countries introduced their major reforms 
around 1998 while developed countries did it around 1997. 
5 See Wallsten (1999). 
6 Note that the data on competition actually raises more issues. Besides the coverage problem; international 
databases on the existence of competition often refer to the “legal” status but not to the “de facto” situation.   3
share of countries with private capital in main fixed lines operators increased from 9% to 
53% in developing countries and from 17% to 82% in developed countries between 1990 
and 2003. This information is summarized in table 1. 
7   
Table 1: Evolution of reform implementation from 1990 to 2003 
  % of sample by country group    Number of Observations 
  Developing  Developed   Developing Developed Total 
Privatization/competition            
    Number of Countries with Private Capital as of 1990  9%  17%    129  35  164 
    Number of Countries with Private Capital as of 2003  53%  82%    129  34  163 
    Average Year of Privatization*  1997  1997    57  23  80 
Regulation            
    Number of Countries with IRA as of 1990  5%  12%    153  51  204 
    Number of Countries with IRA as of 2003  65%  57%    153  51  204 
    Average Year of Establishment of IRA*    1998  1997    93  23  116 
Source: Own calculations using ITU data.  * Average among countries that reformed between 1991 and 2003. 
 
 
The regulatory environment has also changed significantly but tracking changes 
in regulatory systems is much more complex than tracking the extent of private sector 
participation. One of the most directly observable policies aimed to change regulatory 
systems may be establishment of an independent regulatory agency (IRA) for 
telecommunications. This could be the strongest public signal of the commitment to end 
self-regulation and to replace political considerations by economic concerns in regulation 
design.
8 The creation of IRAs is a process being monitored and documented by ITU as 
well. ITU considers that an agency is independent if it is separate from the ministry and 
from the incumbent in its structure, financing, and decision-making process.  
This choice to proxy for the commitment to reform the regulation allows for a 
simple classification of countries into those that have an IRA and those that do not. ITU 
reports a list of countries that have an IRA. After consulting with ITU experts, we assume 
that countries that do not appear in ITU's list do not have an IRA. This assumption is not 
as strong as it may seem. Countries have incentives to report the creation of IRAs since 
these agencies play an important role in the interconnection process (one of the most 
critical regulatory issues for the sector) as well as in other pricing related matters.
9 Table 
1 shows that the share of countries with an IRA increased from 5% to 65% in developed 
countries and from 12% to 57% in developing countries.  
Finally, a comparison of the information on private capital and IRAs provides 
useful additional insights. First, it shows that among developing countries there are more 
                                                 
7 See Estache and Goicoechea (2005a) for a more detailed discussion of the data. 
8 The concept of independence is to a large degree subjective. Estache et. al. (2002) define independence as 
having financial autonomy (because if the minister influences the budget to cover the regulator’s expenses 
there is a potential conflict of interests). But independence might also be considered in terms of capacity to 
make decisions. Also there is some subjectivity in the data generation process. Wallsten (2003) states that 
regulators might have incentives to report they are independent when they are not de facto independent. He 
also makes the argument that no matter what definition of independence is used; regulatory agencies will 
always be to some degree connected to the government.  
9 Interconnection is defined, in the Telecommunications regulation handbook (2004), as connecting two 
networks owned by different companies in a way that ensures the proper functioning of the two systems.   4
countries with IRAs than countries with private involvement in the local loop in 2003 
while the opposite is true for developed countries. In other words, a country does not 
seem to need a regulator to attract private operators and a regulator does not guarantee 
that the government will be open to the private sector in its local loop. Second, it shows 
that, while on average the introduction of the private sector was simultaneous in 
developed countries (in 1997), private sector participation briefly preceded the creation of 
regulatory agencies in developing countries. 
 
 
3. TELECOM PERFORMANCE AND ITS DIMENSIONS 
 
 
In this section, we first discuss the dimensions of telecom performance of interest to 
policymakers. Then we define the performance indicators we have selected in order to 
analyze the impact of reform policies on sector performance and present basic data for 
developing and developed countries. 
It could be argued that the five main dimensions of telecom performance of 
interest to policymakers are fiscal costs, access rates, affordability of services, quality of 
services, and productivity. The main challenge is thus to identify economic indicators that 
best approximate these dimensions in practice and for which data are available for a large 
sample. The need for wide coverage essentially rules out the fiscal dimension of the 
analysis. There is essentially no statistical information on the level of subsidies in the 
sector before and after reforms. While in many countries, in particular the richest ones, it 
could be argued that reforms have simply ended any type of public financing in the 
sector, for many of the poorest, this assumption does not necessarily hold. In the poorest 
parts of Central America or Sub-Saharan Africa for instance, subsidies are still key 
sources of financing for connectivity in rural or remote areas.  
Access indicators should measure the extent to which people have the right to 
obtain or take advantage of telecom services—it does not necessarily mean they use the 
service. Affordability indicators should give a sense of the extent to which telecom 
services are provided at a reasonable price. Quality indicators should encompass both 
qualitative and quantitative measures of quality. The former captures perceived quality or 
costumer satisfaction, while the latter captures technical quality reported by the operators 
with a low degree of discretion involved. Finally, productivity indicators should provide a 
measure of the improvements on the production side of the business. 
10 
With this in mind, we have selected six indicators from the ITU. The proxy for 
access is the number of telephone subscribers defined as “total telephone (fixed mainlines 
plus cellular) subscribers per 1000 inhabitants.” This variable or one of its variations has 
been used in almost all previous papers. We use telephone subscribers, as opposed to 
mainlines, in order to have a better representation of the current telephone market in 
which mainlines and mobiles are substitutes. Even though this may be the best access 
indicator available, it is far from perfect. As Wallsten (1999) explains, it is not possible to 
                                                 
10 See Estache and Goicoechea (2005b) for more details on performance dimensions.   5
differentiate if one person has multiple lines, or if one line is used by multiple persons. 
Thus, using the number of subscribers may over or understate access.  
Basic data are reported in table 2. As expected there are pronounced differences in 
the access rate between developed and developing countries, with the former displaying 
an average access rate approximately 6 times the latter’s. Theoretically, reform policies, 
such as introducing private capital and establishing an IRA, are expected to increase 
access rates. 
 
Table 2: Average performance 1990-2003 
 Means    Number  of  Observations 
  Developing Developed  Developing Developed Total 
Telephone Subscribers per 1000 people  123  709    2073  647  2720 
   (171)  (363)         
Price of Local Phone Call (US cents/10,000 GDPpc)  169  6    1570  446  2016 
   (466)  (6)         
Annual Residential Subscription Fee (US$/10,000 GDPpc)  958  76    1650  461  2111 
   (1891)  (38)         
Annual Business Subscription Fee (US$/10,000 GDPpc)  1387  101    1623  453  2076 
   (2632)  (60)         
Phone Faults (reported faults/100 mainlines)   73  19    1094  328  1422 
   (96)  (17)         
Telephone Mainlines per Employee  68  175    1787  600  2387 
 (57)  (111)         
Source: Own calculations using ITU data. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
Countries were classified in developing and developed according to their 2001 GNI per capita. 
 
 
Regarding affordability, the only information available for a large set of countries 
is the average price and occasionally, the tariff structure. The information is however 
widely seen as not reliable since it does not account for many of the “informal” 
alternatives available to phone users—e.g. calling cards.  This may be why only three of 
the previous cross-country studies have tried to document the impact of reforms on 
prices. We use the price of a 3-minute local phone call in US cents and the monthly 
subscription fee (for residents and for business) in US dollars as our proxies for 
affordability. An issue with these indicators is that they do not take into account prices in 
the mobile segment, thus, we are using proxies for affordability only in the fixed line 
market. However, these are the best data available at the moment.   
The specific definitions offered by ITU for the selected affordability variables are 
as follows: The price of a local call refers to the cost of a peak rate 3-minute fixed line 
call within the same exchange area using the subscriber's own terminal (i.e. not from a 
public telephone). The monthly residential (business) phone subscription fee refers to the 
recurring fixed charge for a residential (business) subscriber for using the public switched 
telephone network. The charge should cover the rental of the line but not the rental of the 
terminal (e.g. telephone set) where the terminal equipment market is liberalized. In some 
cases, the rental charge includes an allowance for free or reduced rate call units. If there 
are different charges for different exchange areas, the largest urban area is used. 
Table 2 shows that a local phone call normalized to GDP per capita was about 30 
times higher in developing countries than in developed ones, while the annual cost of a   6
residential or business line (normalized in the same way) was about 14 times larger in 
developing countries than in developed countries.  
Even though the service is expected to become somewhat more affordable after 
the implementation of reforms, the elimination of cross-subsidies after the incumbent is 
privatized and the tariff rebalancing that often takes place may both increase the price of 
some services, including some of the residential services. Also, some characteristics of 
the reform process, such as the existence of exclusivity periods may influence the price 
upward. It is thus difficult to theoretically define the expected sign of the impact of 
reform policies on these indicators and hence on affordability.  
Data on quality enjoys a much more limited coverage. There are some indicators 
on the quality perception of telephone services, but these are only available for two or 
three years at most. Thus, we rely on technical quality data reported by the telephone 
companies, which is available for a longer period of time. Specifically, we selected the 
number of reported telephone faults per 100 mainlines as a proxy for the quality of 
telephone services. The indicator is formally calculated by dividing the total number of 
reported faults during the year by the total number of mainlines in operation and 
multiplying by 100. It is important to note that the definition of faults might vary. Some 
countries include faulty customer equipment. Others distinguish between reported and 
actual faults found. There is also sometimes a distinction between residential and 
business lines. Another consideration is the time period as some countries report this 
indicator on a monthly basis; in these cases data are converted to yearly estimates. As 
measured here, quality seems to be remarkably worse in developing countries, with an 
average failure rate of 73%, compared to 19% in developed countries. 
Our proxy for quality might be misleading in two ways. First, reporting faults 
might depend on the rules, regulations and dynamic of the sector in the country. Second, 
after reforms are implemented, companies may simply improve their reporting systems 
which may result in a larger number of the faults being measured. It is thus impossible to 
predict ex-ante the correlation between reform policies and reported faults because the 
improvements in reporting and measurement from regulatory reform may actually lead to 
a negative correlation. The net correlation is then the result of an actual performance 
change and a measurement change.  
  Finally, productivity is approximated by labor productivity simply because there 
is not enough data on capital and other inputs to get a better grasp of total factor 
productivity of the sector for a large enough number of countries and for a long period of 
time. Labor productivity data are also generated from the ITU database and approximated 
by the number of telephone mainlines per employee. This indicator is calculated by 
dividing the number of mainlines by the number of staff (with part-time staff converted to 
full-time equivalents) employed by telecommunications operators. Basic data reported in 
table 2 show that labor productivity is (on average) 2.5 times higher in developed than in 
developing countries. However, for both country groups, the expected correlation 
between productivity and reform policies is positive.  
To provide a visual sense of performance at different scenarios of reform policies, 
we provide in table 3 a basic statistical summary that compares countries that have 
committed to reforms to those that have not as of 2003. We report the means, and below 
in parenthesis, we include the associated standard deviations and the number of   7
observations for each group. We report averages of performance outputs for developing 
and developed countries, as well as for the whole sample. Countries are also grouped 
according to their commitment to reforms. In the first column, we include countries that 
have not reformed, in the sense that they neither have an IRA, nor any private ownership. 
The second column reports averages for those countries that have an IRA, but in which 
firms are state-owned. The third column presents countries with private capital but 
without a regulator. Together, columns 2 and 3 refer to those countries that have 
implemented some reform policies. In the fourth column, we include those countries that 
have committed the most to reforms, as they have both an IRA and at least some private 
capital.  
  The big picture that emerges from this very basic data analysis seems to confirm 
some of the expectations about reforms but it also hints at some unexpected correlations. 
In general, countries with private capital and independent regulators have better 
performance indicators.
11 In other words, the basic data analysis tells us that countries 
with private capital and an IRA have, on average, more subscribers, lower price of local 
call, lower fixed costs, lower faults, and higher labor productivity. In section 5 we will 
present an econometric analysis intended to validate or nuance the conclusions derived 
from this very basic data analysis.   
  Additionally, this basic analysis reveals significant differences on the correlation 
between performance and reform policies between developed and developing countries. 
Regarding access, the gap between reformers and non-reformer is bigger in developed 
countries than in developing ones. This somewhat naïve look at the data suggests that in 
terms of access developed countries have managed to get more from reforms than 
developing countries. It already hints at the need to look into the relevance of other 
factors such as governance, which may work differently in developed and developing 
countries.   
  Regarding affordability and quality, developing countries that have committed to 
reforms in some way (by allowing the presence of private capital, establishing an 
independent regulator, or both) enjoy better performance than developing countries 
without these reforms. An exception is observed in the price of a local call, where 
establishing a regulator is correlated with an increase the price. These conclusions do not 
hold for developed countries mainly because most of them have committed to reforms, 
and therefore some samples are too small to draw any conclusions. Keeping this in mind, 
we observe in table 3 that reforms in developed countries seem to buy lower business 
subscription fees, and that the presence of private capital improves labor productivity 
(while having an independent regulator is on average correlated with lower productivity). 
However, some developed countries that have not reformed seem to be doing better than 
the reformers. Examples are found in the price of a local call and the number of phone 
faults. 
 
                                                 
11 It is important to keep in mind that this is a statement about correlation, not about causality. This positive 
correlation may reflect a number of things (for example selection bias, as it might be the case that reformers 
do everything better than non-reformers). This initial assessment needs to be validated by the econometric 
work discussed later.     8
Table 3: Performance vs. reform in 2003 – Averages for different country groups 
 
Mean 
(standard deviation, number of observations) 












Telephone Subscribers/ 1000 people in…         
    Developing  181  191  226  412  290 
 (158,16)  (214,30)  (205,10) (367,46)  (300,115) 
    Developed  960  1049  1171  1360  1277 
 (272,2)  (378,2)  (254,5)  (175,20)  (276,36) 
    All countries  268  245  541  700  526 
 (300,18)  (303,32)  (508,15) (543,66)  (514,151) 
Price of Local Phone Call in…           
    Developing  87  95  58  60  75 
 (138,9)  (147,21)  (68,4)  (97,37)  (114,84) 
    Developed  0  6  0.9  6  5 
 (na,1)  (na,1)  (1,2)  (3,12)  (5,20) 
    All countries  78  91  39  47  62 
 (133,10)  (145,22)  (60,6)  (87,49)  (106,104) 
Annual Residential Subscription Fee in…        
    Developing  630  464  253  392  499 
 (577,10)  (364,19)  (212,3) (410,38)  (533,84) 
    Developed  57  99  91  83  79 
 (na,1)  (na,1)  (65,2)  (32,14)  (32,22) 
    All countries  578  446  188  309  412 
 (574,11)  (363,20)  (177,5) (376,52)  (504,106) 
Annual Business Subscription Fee in…        
    Developing  830  650  438  629  759 
 (706,10)  (533,19)  (310,3) (633,37)  (726,83) 
    Developed  132  99  134  94  97 
 (na,1)  (na,1)  (95,2)  (32,12)  (41,20) 
    All countries  767  623  316  498  630 
 (703,11)  (534,20)  (279,5) (596,49)  (702,103) 
Phone Faults in…        
    Developing  64  26  53  27  38 
 (47,6)  (32,10)  (na,1)  (25,16)  (39,39) 
    Developed  4  ..  23  21  17 
 (na,1)  ..  (na,1)  (30,9)  (23,16) 
    All countries  55  26  38  24  32 
 (49,7)  (32,10)  (21,2)  (26,25)  (36,55) 
Mainlines per Employee in…        
    Developing  66  107  110  108  98 
 (31,10)  (87,9)  (66,3)  (63,16)  (70,43) 
    Developed  ..  146  441  192  215 
 ..  (43,2)  (120,2)  (50,10)  (96,19) 
    All countries  66  114  242  141  134 
  (31,10) (80,11) (197,5) (71,26)  (95,62) 
Source: Own calculations using ITU data. Countries were classified in developing and developed according to their 2001 GNI per capita. 
- Coverage for 2003 is not as good as the one for previous years. Thus, for some groups samples are too small to draw significant conclusions.  
- na means not applicable. Used when there is only one observation in the group, which makes impossible to calculate the standard deviation.  
- IRA refers to independent regulatory agency, and priv refers to the existence of private capital. 
- The price of a 3-min local call is expressed in 2000 US cents/10,000 GDPpc; while annual subscription fees are expressed in 2000 US dollars/10,000 GDP pc. 
- Phone faults correspond to reported faults per 100 mainlines. 
 
 
4. THE EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF TELECOM REFORMS 
 
 
The two main reform policies covered in this paper have already been at the center of 
most of the cross-country analyses of telecom performance. Before presenting the new 
results derived from more recent observations, it may be useful to cover in some detail 
the main lessons from the existing literature.  
The first consideration that comes to mind is that, simply because the time   
elapsed since the reforms has been rather short, most of these earlier results can often be 
viewed as a first cut at early stages of reform or as the short-term impact of reform. The   9
design of the studies is somewhat diverse and often reflects the authors’ preferences in 
terms of the trade-off between coverage and specificity of the characteristics of reform 
policies. Some authors have chosen to use variables about the existence (or 
implementation) of reform policies with large samples, while others have used variables 
that capture details or specific characteristics of policies (in terms of degree, procedures, 
and/or sequence) with smaller samples. The main concern of authors preferring more 
detailed modeling of reforms is that the use of dummy variables on the existence of 
reforms may not capture the diversity of reforms. For example, a dummy for the 
existence of private capital would not capture the relative importance of private funds in 
the country, or a dummy for the existence of an independent regulator would not capture 
the degree of independence. The main conclusions of previous studies are summarized 
below and more details are given in the appendix.  
Results are quite robust when proving the importance of private sector 
participation in spite of the impressive variety of private sector measures, spanning from 
simple indicators of the existence of private participation to specific modeling of the 
privatization transactions. There is also a wide range of concern in terms of modeling 
private sector participation vs. private sector participation with competition. In general, 
the emerging story is that competition matters and often more so than privatization. 
Starting with Wallsten (1999), who explores the effects of telecom reforms on 
sector performance using a sample of 30 Latin American and African countries in the 
period 1984-1997, the initial evidence from general cross-country models is that 
privatization combined with the existence of a separate regulator has more benefits in 
terms of performance than having privatization alone. Wallsten finds that competition is 
the reform policy that has the most beneficial effects on performance. Among 
performance indicators he includes mainlines per 100 people, number of payphones, 
network connection capacity, employees per 100 mainlines, and price of local phone call. 
Focusing of Asia in the period 1985-1999, Fink et al. (2001) confirm Wallsten’s results 
and also find that privatization has a greater positive impact in performance if it is 
accompanied by competition for all performance indicators. They add that 
corporatization (as an indicator of public sector’s determination to improve sector 
performance) has a significant positive effect on access (mainline penetration), quality 
(network digitalization), and sector productivity (mainlines per worker).  
With a larger sample of countries (86 developing countries during the same 
period), Fink et al. (2002) measure the effect of competition in local services, regulation, 
and privatization on mainlines penetration and mainlines per employee controlling for 
income and population. They show that complete liberalization has a positive effect on 
performance; that both privatization and competition improve performance; and that the 
later reinforces the former. Finally, they conclude that the sequence matters.  
Generally, the papers trying to model in more detail the reforms draw very similar 
conclusions. D’Souza and Megginson (1999) model exclusivity periods as a reform 
variable (to capture more information on competition) and find that it is correlated with 
capital expenditures in telecoms. Their analysis covers only 28 countries but because it is 
firm-based, it covers 85 companies. Li and Xu (2004) use variables like the share of 
private capital, the existence of exclusivity periods, and the procedure of privatization 
(dummy=1 if privatization was done through public share offer). The sample consists of 
166 countries in the period 1981-1998 for privatization regressions. However, when   10
focusing on the details of competition their sample size shrinks to 43 countries during the 
period 1990-1998. They find that privatization and competition positively affect 
performance regardless how they are measured, and that if they work together the gains 
are even bigger. Regarding the details of reforms, they find that privatizing by offering 
public shares positively contributes to the performance of the mobile sector. Additionally, 
they find that granting exclusivity periods reduces the gains from privatization. Wallsten 
(2004) uses data on 32 privatized telecom firms representing 28 countries and finds that 
exclusivity periods are associated with significant increases in the firm’s sale price and 
significant decreases in the incumbent’s investment in telecom network and in the 
number of payphones, mobile subscribers, and international outgoing minutes.  
The research on regulation points to a number of fundamental questions to be 
asked by reformers. The importance of sequencing is one of the key ones. Using panel 
data for 200 countries from 1985-1999, Wallsten (2003) finds that establishing an IRA 
before the privatization takes place improves telecom investment and penetration. Then 
with a sample of 33 countries he shows that investors are willing to pay more for firms if 
a regulatory reform took place prior to privatization. Somewhat surprisingly, he finds that 
privatization and IRA are negatively correlated with the number of mainlines.  Another 
important contribution is the debate on the relevance of the independence of the 
regulators. Wallsten (2003) suggests that too much independence may be harmful if 
politics capture consumers’ preferences, as it weakens the relationship between 
consumers and government and strengthen the relationship between private firms and 
government. In other words, it might be easier for telecom firms to influence the 
regulator than for consumers.  
A final issue to be considered is the endogeneity of reforms. To illustrate its 
relevance, Gual and Trillas (2004) first estimate two policy indexes (one for openness 
and one for the existence of an IRA) and then analyze their impact on performance. They 
find that pro-entry policies and the creation of an independence agency have positive 
effects on network penetration and negative effects on productivity. However, after 
accounting for endogeneity, results are not very robust statistically.  
Interestingly, even though there is “political” or conceptual consensus about the 
importance of institutions and governance for sector performance, a very limited number 
of studies have included such variables in the analysis. As mentioned before, Wallsten 
(1999) includes the expropriation risk as a governance control. More recently, Gutiérrez 
(2003) explicitly recognizes the importance of governance when assessing sector 
performance. He uses a governance index as an explanatory variable to analyze the 
effects of telecom reforms on performance in 22 Latin American countries during the 
period 1980-1997. However, the components of his governance index refer more to 
particular characteristics of reform policies in the sector than to governance structures per 
se. After taking into account the endogeneization of policy variables, he finds that 
regulatory procedures influence network expansion and efficiency.  
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5. NEW ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE 
 
 
This section discusses our econometric estimates of the impact of two of the main 
telecom reform policies (i.e. the presence of private capital and the establishment of an 
independent regulator) on access, affordability, quality and labor productivity based on 
the experience during the period 1990-2003. We also test the extent to which reform 
policies affect differently developed and developing countries.  
Focusing on these two reform policies would however tend to ignore the fact that 
reforms do not take place in a vacuum. Indeed, there are wide differences in governance 
capacity and commitment across countries, whether developed or developing, which may 
influence the effects of reforms on performance. The extent to which private capital may 
be attracted to a country may be driven by more commercial considerations such as the 
investment risk of the country—and this is the case even if competition and support to 
private investors are formally part of the laws of the country. Similarly, the scope of 
action of an independent regulator may be quite different in a country with a high degree 
of corruption than in a country with a low degree of corruption.    
To include corruption and investment risk in the explanation of telecom 
performance, we rely on two sets of data from the International Country Risk Guide. The 
first is a corruption index, defined as an assessment of corruption within the political 
system. It includes financial corruption (like bribes connected with trade, taxes or 
protection), but it focuses more on actual corruption in the form of excessive patronage, 
nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close 
ties between politics and business. The second is an investment risk index, defined as the 
sum of three subcomponents with equal weights (contract viability or expropriation, 
profits repatriation, and payment delays). We have transformed the two original indexes 
so that they now vary continuously between 0 and 1, with zero meaning low value and 1 
high value. Table 4 presents basic statistics for these indexes. Developing countries 
perform worse along both dimensions. Average corruption and investment risk during the 
period 1990-2003 are 0.54 and 0.47 respectively in developing countries and 0.25 and 
0.31 in developed ones. 
In our analysis, rather than simply adding corruption and investment risk as 
determinants of performance, we explicitly account for their interactions with the two 
reform policies assessed (introduction of private capital and establishment of an IRA).  
 
Table 4: Average governance 1990-2003 
  Means 
(standard deviation)   Number  of  Observations 
 Developing  Developed    Developing  Developed  Total 
Corruption Index (0=low 1=high corruption)  0.54  0.25    1373  482  1855 
 (0.17)  (0.21)         
Investment Risk Index (0=low 1= high risk)  0.47  0.31    1373  482  1855 
 (0.19)  (0.19)         
   12
The general model to test can now be specified as follows:  
Yit=β0+POLit’β1 + (DVi* POLit’) β2 + GOVit’β3 +  (GOVit’* POLit’)β4 + Xit'β5 + di + d(t) + uit 
 
where i indexes a country, and t time. Y is an output variable which measures one 
of the performance dimensions covered here. POL is a vector of policy variables, GOV is 
a vector of governance variables, DV is a dummy equal to one if a country is developed 
and 0 otherwise, and X is a vector of additional regressors. Finally, a linear time trend 
d(t) takes into account technological advances.
12 The model allows for country fixed 
effects di. Identification of the model hence stems from the deviation of within countries 
variation in the regressors around a common macroeconomic trend. All regressions are 
weighted by the average population size in the country between 1990 and 2003.  
Our interest is to understand how some major telecommunication reforms affect 
access, affordability, quality, and productivity depending on the institutional setting. We 
are particularly interested in understanding if higher corruption and investment risk 
dampen (or perhaps magnify) the effect of reforms. This is the rationale for introducing 
in the regression the interaction between GOV and POL variables. However, one has to 
be cautions in drawing conclusions from the coefficients associated to these interactions. 
Countries with lower governance are also generally countries with lower income and one 
has to be sure not to attribute to poor governance the heterogonous effect of reform 
policies across countries at different stages of development. This is the reason why we 
also add the interaction between policy (POL) and development level (DV) variables. 
This allows us to identify the heterogonous effect of reform policies on performance for 
different institutional settings, net of the heterogonous effect that these reforms 
potentially have in countries at different stages of development. 
For the policy variables, POL, we rely on two dummy variables. The first, PRIV, 
reflects whether the country has opened its doors to private operators. The second, IRA, 
reflects whether the country i at time t has established an independent regulatory agency. 
We also model the interactions between the two (POLit’= [PRIVit IRAit PRIVit*IRAit]).  
As measures of governance, we use the two indexes discussed earlier: corruption 
and investment risk (GOVit’=[CORRit  INVRISKit]). The term GOVit’* POLit’ picks up 
interactions between governance and policy variables. This is a vector that contains all 
interactions of CORR and INVRISK with IRA and PRIV. Because the model controls for 
country fixed effects, the main effects of the DV variable are also included in the model 
(but not identified). 
Two important controls are included in vector X, income and population. 
Specifically, we use the GDP per capita in 2000 constant US dollars to capture the 
purchasing power of the population; and the total population to capture the size of the 
market from the demand side. 
13 
The unbalanced panel has 2,856 observations including data for 204 countries 
during the period 1990-2003. 153 countries were classified as developing (if their 2001 
                                                 
12 Results are essentially unchanged when including year dummies.  
13 Results are essentially unchanged without controlling for population size. 
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GNI per capita was equal or less than $9,205); and 51 countries were classified as 
developed (if their 2001 GNI per capita was higher than $9,205). As indicated earlier, 
while data coverage is generally quite large, there is a great deal of variability across 
variables. For instance, while we have almost no missing values for access, the sample 
almost halves when we consider non missing observations for quality, and it falls by 
about one fourth if one looks at affordability and institutional variables. For every 
performance indicator, we used the largest possible sample. To reduce sample selection 
bias, the samples include countries that have reformed as well as an important number of 
countries that have not reformed.  
Our assumption is that the adoption of a certain policy is conditionally exogenous 
to the error term in (1). Because we control for country fixed effects, a linear trend, and 
GDP per capita, we completely absorb differences in the output variables due to intrinsic 
time unvarying characteristics of each county (e.g. their history), changes in economic 
performance and the generalized trend in privatization and IRA adoption. Ultimately, we 
claim that conditional on these covariates, reform policies are uncorrelated to the error 
term in (1) and that the GLS estimates of the coefficients on the policy variables are 
consistent.  
Table 5 summarizes the results. Each column of the table refers to a different 
output related to telecom performance. The first column reports the results for access 
measured by the log of telephone subscribers over population, columns 2 to 4 refer to 
affordability, proxied by the log of the cost of a local phone call, and the logs of the 
residential and business monthly subscription fees. Column 5 refers to quality, measured 
by the log of reported telephone faults per 100 mainlines. Column 6 presents results for 
the log of mainlines per employee. Overall, the statistical test provided at the bottom 
suggests a good fit of the models. 
It is difficult to ascertain the average effect of the policies of interest by looking at 
table 5. Simply looking at the coefficient of the reform policy of interest would be 
misleading. This is because the model includes the interaction between reform policies 
and the dummy for developed countries (DV) plus the interaction between reform 
policies and governance indexes. All this information needs to be considered jointly to be 
able to make a reliable statement on the impact of reform policies based on these results. 
Looking at the coefficients in the first three rows of table 5 would only tell us about the 
effect of reform policies in developing countries (the omitted group) when the corruption 
and investment risk indexes are zero. 
Table 5 is however quite useful in assessing how policies interact with the 
governance variables. For instance, it shows that privatization offsets the effect of 
corruption on our measure of access and on one of our measures of affordability. 
However, it has no effect on the impact of corruption on labor productivity or quality. 
Privatization has an impact on the effect of investment risk on all performance indicators. 
It offsets the effect of investment risk on access and affordability but it reinforces the 
effect on quality and labor productivity.  
With respect to the interaction between IRAs and governance, it is interesting to 
note that, all other things being equal, the introduction of an IRA reduces the effect of 
corruption on access rates and labor productivity, as the interaction variables for each   14
performance indicator have a significant negative sign. Also, the introduction of an IRA 
has no significant effect on the impact of corruption on prices. Regarding the risk index, 
table 5 shows that the introduction of an IRA offsets the effect of investment risks on 
prices, quality and labor productivity.   
Note that these interaction coefficients have a “two-way” reading. They can also 
be used to show the effects of the governance environment on reform policies. Corruption 
offsets the effects of an IRA on access, quality and productivity. It also offsets the effects 
of privatization on access and affordability. Similarly, investment risk increases the 
impact of IRA on labor productivity and quality but offsets the effects on the price of 
local calls.  
Interestingly, row 3 shows that private capital and IRA hardly interact, except for 
the price of local phone calls. In this case, the introduction of both policies jointly implies 
a lower average price. In other words, the two policies reinforce each other. Comparing 
this with the partial effect of these policies on prices, it is interesting to note that 
considered jointly they are good for affordability, while considered separately they hurt 
it.  
At the more general level, as in most of these models, table 5 shows that the 
income levels are generally significant for all performance indicators, although less so 
quality. So is population, except again for quality but also for usage price. Population 
growth is also associated with a reduction in connection fees, reflecting the fact that 
network costs can be shared among a larger number of users as population (and access 
and usage) grow.   15
Table 5: Econometric results 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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(1)  Privatization 0.439***  0.905***  0.716*** 0.648*** -0.472**  0.029 
    [0.088] [0.138] [0.164] [0.157] [0.207] [0.090] 
(2)  IRA  0.047 0.562*** 0.121 0.123  0.446**  -0.102 
    [0.096] [0.149] [0.173] [0.167] [0.224] [0.102] 
(3)  IRA * Privatization  0.014  -0.253*** -0.015  -0.075  0.078  0.031 
    [0.037] [0.059] [0.066] [0.063] [0.086] [0.040] 
(4)  Privatization * 
Developed  -0.526*** -0.064 -0.548***  -0.309*** -0.423** -0.285*** 
    [0.067] [0.103] [0.121] [0.116] [0.202] [0.067] 
(5)  IRA * Developed  0.014  -0.334***  -0.264** -0.114  -0.306 -0.253*** 
    [0.076] [0.112] [0.131] [0.126] [0.221] [0.076] 
(6)  Corruption Index 
(0=low 1=high)  0.687*** 0.435***  -0.034 0.046 -0.202  0.566*** 
    [0.058] [0.130] [0.151] [0.145] [0.199] [0.057] 
(7)  Privatization * 
Corruption  -0.216** -1.115*** -0.524*** -0.455**  0.150  -0.082 
    [0.098] [0.175] [0.187] [0.181] [0.277] [0.116] 
(8)  IRA * Corruption  -0.280**  0.144  0.079 0.200  -1.339***  -0.584*** 
    [0.122] [0.198] [0.225] [0.217] [0.323] [0.142] 
(9)  Investment Risk Index 
(0=low 1=high)  0.508*** 0.340**  0.016  0.232 -1.670*** -0.015 
    [0.079] [0.147] [0.160] [0.156] [0.212] [0.078] 
(10)  Privatization * 
Investment Risk  -0.186* -0.746*** -0.371*  -0.348*  0.672** 0.390*** 
    [0.106] [0.183] [0.198] [0.189] [0.281] [0.117] 
(11)  IRA * Investment Risk  0.088  -0.702*** 0.146  -0.145  0.655**  0.861*** 
    [0.105] [0.180] [0.189] [0.186] [0.280] [0.116] 
(12)  Ln GDPpc (2000 US$)  2.173***  -0.619*** -1.516*** -0.725*** 0.386* 2.383*** 
    [0.050] [0.161] [0.174] [0.167] [0.219] [0.059] 
(13)  Ln Population  1.433***  -0.313  -4.696*** -2.367***  -0.821  1.148*** 
    [0.242] [0.425] [0.477] [0.474] [0.635] [0.262] 
(14)  Time Trend  0.091***  -0.050***  0.065*** 0.010 -0.080***  0.049*** 
    [0.005] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.013] [0.005] 
  Constant -215.877***  112.275***  -43.055*** 19.473 169.524***  -131.740*** 
   [7.601]  [14.207]  [14.152]  [14.849] [19.470]  [8.147] 
  Observations  1597 1322 1412 1393  926  1436 
  R-squared 0.99  0.85  0.81 0.84 0.95 0.96 
  R-squared within  0.94  0.36 0.19 0.13 0.43  0.87 
  Number of countries 
in sample  126 118 123 123 115  125 
- Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
- R-squared is significant at the 1% level in all regressions. 
- Developing countries are those in which 2001 GNI per capita was equal or less than $9,205. 
- All regressions include country fixed effects. 
- Estimation technique: GLS. 
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Table 5 results are useful but they do not provide us with a correct assessment of 
the average total effect of reform policies across countries. If we add the coefficients in 
rows 4 and 5 to those in rows 1 to 3, we get the effects of reform policies in developed 
countries assuming no corruption and no investment risk. To account for the effect of 
corruption and investment risk, we could further add their coefficients assuming different 
levels of corruption and investment risk. Thus, all these calculations give us the effects of 
reforms under specific scenarios and not the average total effect of reforms across 
countries. The total average effect of reforms depends on these complex interactions and 
can be obtained by calculating the marginal effects. To facilitate the interpretation of the 
results, we have computed the marginal effects for the variables of interest.
14 We report 
them in table 6.  
 
































Effects of private capital:        
 All  countries  0.134*** -0.032 0.174***  0.185***  -0.198***  0.099*** 
 Developed  (DV=1)  -0.256*** -0.080  -0.222** -0.039 -0.508***  -0.110** 
 Developing  (DV=0)  0.270*** -0.016 0.327***  0.270*** -0.086 0.175*** 
Effects of IRA:         
 All  countries  0.548 -4.488*** 1.103  -0.877 4.333**  5.468*** 
 Developed  (DV=1)  0.558 -4.739*** 0.913  -0.960 4.109**  5.282*** 
 Developing  (DV=0)  0.544 -4.405*** 1.177  -0.846 4.415**  5.536*** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
         
We find in table 6 that PRIV has significant impact on 5 of our 6 measures of 
performance. On average, private capital is associated with an increase in the number of 
telephone subscribers, residential and business subscription fees, and a reduction of 
telephone faults. It also was associated with enhancements in labor productivity. In other 
words, private capital leads to more and better service, but at a price to the consumer. 
Additionally, we find that the presence of private capital affects differently developing 
and developed countries. More specifically, it is associated with an increase in the 
number of telephone subscribers per 1000 people and an increase in subscription fees in 
developing countries, but a decline in developed ones. Telephone faults decline is only 
statistically significant in developed countries, implying that most of the improvements 
observed in the poorest countries can be attributed to technological change rather than to 
the access to private operators. Finally, private capital improves labor productivity in 
developing countries while it deteriorates it in developed ones.  
The introduction of an IRA proved to be less effective than PRIV, in the sense 
that its effects are significant in only 3 of our 6 measures of performance. On average, it 
                                                 
14 To compute the marginal effects of PRIV (or IRA) we first calculated the derivate of equation (1) with 
respect to PRIV (IRA), setting all the other variables to their average value, and then we tested the 
hypothesis that the derivate is equal to zero.     17
would bring down the price of local calls, intensify reported telephone faults, and 
improve labor productivity. With respect to the price of local calls, the results suggest 
that an IRA is important to ensure local users that the potential gains from technological 
progress are not offset with the increase in local tariffs often associated to tariff 
rebalancing.
15 Regarding quality, the deterioration associated with the existence of an 
IRA probably reflects the fact that an IRA does a better job at measuring quality than a 
self-regulated operator. Thus, reform policies initially may end up increasing measured 
faults, even if they ultimately improve quality.
16 Finally, results suggest that the strongest 
effect of the introduction of an IRA is the enhancement of labor productivity.   
When comparing the effects of an IRA in developing and developed countries, 
table 6 shows that these effects have the same sign in both groups but are stronger in 
developing countries in terms of labor productivity and quality, and are stronger in 
developed countries in terms of prices. Somewhat surprisingly, the introduction of an 
IRA has no statistically significant impact on access and on the fixed component of the 
tariff paid by users, whether residential or business. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
 
We first reported basic data on telecom reform policies and performance outputs which 
hinted at a number of correlations. Based on this very basic data analysis, countries with 
private capital and/or an independent regulatory agency (IRA) seem to have, on average, 
more subscribers, lower local call price, lower fixed costs, lower faults, and higher labor 
productivity. We also observed that countries that have reformed present, on average, 
better performance outputs than countries that have not reformed. However, there seemed 
to be differences in the impact of reform policies between developing and developed 
countries. 
We then provided a more formal assessment of these apparent correlations 
through an econometric analysis to refine the conclusions emerging from the basic data 
analysis. More specifically, we could confirm that countries with private capital have 
more subscribers, lower local call price, lower faults, and higher labor productivity. 
However, in terms of fixed costs, econometric results differ from the basic data analysis. 
We found that private capital is actually associated with an increase in residential and 
business subscription fees, which is consistent with the tariff rebalancing that typically 
takes place when ending direct subsidies as part of most reforms. With respect to the 
independent regulator, we could confirm that countries with an IRA have lower local call 
price and higher labor productivity, but we found again some discrepancies with the basic 
                                                 
15 Tariff rebalancing usually takes place as part of the reforms after the government eliminates historical 
cross-subsidies that favor local calls.   
16 In the absence of a good measure of the probability of detection we cannot but remain agnostic about the 
true effect of reform policies on the quality of service. For instance, if we further control for log subscribers 
in the quality equation the coefficient on PRIV*DV grows, suggesting that congestion externalities due to 
the enlargement of the sector following privatization do not explain the results. 
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data analysis. First, we found that the existence of an IRA was associated with more 
faults. Second, we actually found that the regulator does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the number of subscribers and fixed costs.  
The less than systematic success of reforms across indicators may be explained by 
the fact that governance interferes with the effects of reforms (although governance may 
also substitute for or trigger reforms when there is no willingness to reform). This is what 
the tests conducted here seem to indicate. We found that corruption has, on average, 
statistically significant beneficial effects on performance in terms of access and labor 
productivity in countries that have not reformed. However, we also found that in 
countries that committed to reforms, reform policies offset the beneficial impact of 
corruption on performance. Overall, the main result to retain may be that even though 
corruption may lead to some performance improvements in the presence of red tape and 
resistance to change, reform policies can lead to stronger and better performance outputs 
in a much more ethical way. Increases in investment risk were associated with 
improvements in access and quality; however, the presence of private capital offsets these 
beneficial effects. 
Regarding the differential effects of reform policies in developed and developing 
countries, the paper provides additional new insights. The presence of private capital 
influences more dimensions of performance across country groups than the establishment 
of an IRA. However, the effects of private capital usually work in opposite directions for 
developing and developed countries. Developing countries benefit from private capital in 
terms of access and labor productivity, but they get worse in terms of residential and 
business subscription fees. In contrast, developed countries benefit from private capital in 
terms of residential subscription fees and reported faults, but they get worse in terms of 
access, and labor productivity. Even though IRA affects fewer measures of performance, 
its effects have the same sign for developing and developed countries. Thus, in this case 
differences between developing and developed countries are given in terms of magnitude. 
Developed countries benefit more in terms of local call price and their phone faults 
increase less, while developing countries benefit more in terms of labor productivity.  
Finally, while these results are important for policymakers, they also hint at 
complex issues and trade-offs which deserve a much more refined analysis than the one 
we have been able to produce here. Possible extensions to our work include a better 
assessment of reform processes and sequences as well as a much less simple modeling of 
the degree of reforms from a cross-country perspective. At the more technical level, it 
would be interesting to generate good instruments to relax the assumption that reforms 
are exogenous to sector performance.  
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APPENDIX: A survey of empirical studies on the effects of telecom reform 




































































































































































































































































































Mainlines per 100 
people, growth in 
mainlines, mainlines 
per employee, growth 
in mainlines per 
employee 
        X  X       Panel  data:  FE  with 
instrumental variable. 
Privatization has positive effect on 
mainlines. No evidence that it leads to 
higher growth in mainlines in countries 
with GDPpc<10000. Privatization has 
positive effect on mainlines per 
employee and its growth. Competition 






23 OECD  1991-
1997 
Productivity, prices, 
and quality of long 
distance service & 
mobile service 
      X    X  X  X  X      Panel data: country FE and 
RE. F, Breush-Pagan, and 
Hausman tests to select 
between RE and FE. 
Technique not specified. 
Comp has a strong positive impact on 
productivity and quality, and reduces 











Mainlines per 100 
people, number of 
payphones, connection 
capacity, employees 
per 100 mainlines, 
price of local call 
  X   X  X X  X     X Panel  data:  country  and  year 
FE. Technique not specified. 
Competition has positive effect, and 
matters the most. Priv has negative 
effect on mainlines and connection 
capacity. Priv* ira has a positive impact 
on connection cap. And mitigates 
negative impact of priv.  
Fink et 
al. 2001  




mainlines per worker 
X        X  X  X  X     Panel  data:  country  FE. 
Technique not specified.  
Priv has bigger impact on performance 
if accompanied by competition. 





: 39 AFR, 
10 MNA, 




mainlines per employee 
      X    X  X  X  X  X    Panel data: country FE and 
time trend. Two-stage 
estimation (first estimate 
mobile penetration), then use 
it in main eq.; GLS. Kmenta's 
cross-sectionally 
heteroscedastic and time-
wise autocorrelated (CHTA) 
approach. 
Liberalization has positive effect on 
performance, competition and priv 







Mainlines per 100 
people and mainlines 
per employee 
    X    X  X  X          Panel data: country and year 
FE. Accounts for endogeneity 
of policies. Static model: two-
stage LSDV. Dynamic 
models: GMM (Anderson-
Hsiao & Arrellano-Bond) 
Competition and privatization have 
positive impact on mainlines, and 
mainlines per employee. Also, 








Mainlines in operation 
per 100 people, growth 
of mainlines in 
operation per 100 
people, mainlines in 
operation per employee 
    X  X    X  X          Panel data: FE and RE. 
Breush Pagan and Hausman 
tests. Instrumental variable 
approach: estimating first 
policy variables with probits.  
Privatization and ira have positive effect 
on teledensity, operating efficiency. 
Competition and price cap have positive 














mobile subscribers, and 
implied firm's value 
     X  X  X  X    Panel  data:  country  and  year 
FE. Technique not specified.  
Negative effect of ira alone. 
Privatization alone has negative effect 
on mainlines and positive on investment 
and mobiles. Ira before priv has positive 









Firms' sale price, 
incumbent's investment 
in telecom, payphone, 
mobile penetration, 
international calling 
        X       Panel  data:  country  and  year 
FE for investment equation. 
Technique not specified.  
Exclusivity periods associated with 
increase in firm's sale price, and have 
negative effect on mainlines, 








lac, 2 mna, 






      X      X          OLS, IV (with probit 
equation). They first estimate 
policy variables and then use 
them to assess the their 
effect on performance (they 
don't use policy dummies). 
Weak protection to investors, quasi-
rents, and large incumbent have 
positive influence in the creation of ira.  
ira and openness have positive impact 
on mainline penetration and negative 
impact on productivity, results are not 
too robust 










Per capita investment 
in telecoms, 
employment in 
telecoms, mainlines per 
100 people, mobiles 
per 100 people, price of 
local calls, and labor 
productivity. 
        X  X  X      Panel  data:  country  FE, 
2SLS. 
Full privatization proved to have 
positive impact in multiple outputs, 
while partial privatization was not 
significant. Priv and comp have positive 
effect, and having both would bring 
more gains than having one 
(1) Policy variables = 1 to 10; governance = 11. Most models included a combination of the following as other controls: international settlement payments, mainline penetration, investment in the sector, prices, waiting list for 
mainlines, population, urbanization, GDP, aid, imports, and exports. (2) Possible techniques are: OLS, 2SLS, GLS, LSDV, GMM static, GMM dynamic (Arellano-Bond), and IV among others. 
 